Women’s participation in political parties: An exploratory study on Dutch political party committees by Derkx, Aniek
 1 
Women’s participation in political parties: an exploratory study on Dutch 
political party committees  
Aniek Derkx 
 
 
-   
Aniek Derkx (s2378337) 
Political Science, Dutch politics, University Leiden 
Course specialization: The Parliamentary Arena 
Supervisor: dr. S.P. (Simon) Otjes (s.p.otjes@rug.nl) 
Second reader: prof. dr. I.C. (Ingrid) van Biezen 
Submission date: 10 January 2019 
Words: 9981 
 2 
Women’s participation in political parties: an exploratory study on Dutch 
political party committees  
Aniek Derkx 
 
KEYWORDS 
Gender equality; women’s political participation; political party committees; the Netherlands  
Introduction  
The role of women in politics has been the subject to a lot of research (see for example: Bäck 
and Debus, 2019; Blumenau, 2019; Bolzendahl and Coffé, 2010; Conway, 2010; Kenworthy 
and Malami, 1999; Kunovich and Paxton, 2005). Most of these studies on gender in politics 
focus on women’s political participation in general or on their representation in legislatures 
(Bolzendahl and Coffé, 2010). They also mostly focus on women’s participation and 
ABSTRACT 
This article studies the explanations for women’s participation in political parties by 
looking at their participation in committees in the Netherlands. The article builds on 
existing literature on women’s political participation. It derives five explanations from the 
literature and tests them. The study finds that supply side factors are most important. These 
are factors that influence the pool of women that is available for participating in political 
parties. The study shows that both the share of working women in a country and the share 
of female party members in a party cause the share of female committee members. When 
more women work and more women are member of a political party, more women will 
attend committees in this party. The study includes both election program committees and 
selection committees. We obtained the data on these committees by studying election 
programs, annual reviews and similar documents that are available at the Dutch 
Documentation Center of Political Parties. 
 3 
representation at the national level (Caul, 1999, p. 80). As Caul mentions, mostly looking at 
national level components of women’s representation and participation does not include the 
importance of political parties as gatekeepers (Caul, 1999, p. 80). Political parties have an 
important role in nominating women on candidate lists and deciding the share of women they 
send to parliament. As Fisher writes, ‘the voter may make the final decisions, but his choice is 
usually limited to candidates and issues already decided upon by political parties’ (Fisher, 1947, 
p. 87).  
To cover this gap in research, Caul’s study looked into the relation between party 
characteristics and the share of female members of parliament (Caul, 1999, p. 80). In addition 
to Caul’s research, our study will focus on the extent to which women participate in political 
parties and the factors that influence this participation. This is precisely because of the 
important role of political parties as gatekeepers. For even if we know how parties select women 
on the national level, we still do not know what triggers women to participate on the party level 
itself. The question that is central in this research is therefore: ‘To what extent do women 
participate in political parties and what explains their participation?’  
Studying gender in politics is relevant for several reasons. First of all, gender is a way 
of measuring the openness of a political system for minorities (Caul, 1999, p. 80). In our case 
we study the openness of political parties. This is important for the descriptive and substantive 
representativeness of minorities, especially since parties have this gatekeeper’s role (Gwiazda, 
2015, p. 679; Mansbridge, 1999; Wängnerud, 2009). Also, enhancing women’s opportunities 
for gaining a seat in parliament may increase competition for seats and may increase diversity 
of views and experiences among representatives as well (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 260; 
Caul, 1999, p. 79-80). Lastly, women may steer debates into different directions, because they 
prioritize different subjects than men (Goedert et al., 2014, p. 292-293; Hughes et al., 2007, p. 
273).  
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In our study we explore five explaining factors by analyzing their relationship with 
women’s share in political party committees in the Netherlands from 1971 to 2019. The factors 
we look at are the female labor market, female party membership, gender quota, the female 
members of parliament and the party position. By executing several analyses, we find that the 
share of working women and the share of female party members are the strongest explanations.  
Explanations for women’s political participation 
Explanations for women’s participation in politics in the literature are divided into supply and 
demand side factors (Hughes, et al., 2007).1 We will discuss them by using the same division.  
Supply side factors are factors that influence the pool of women that have the will and 
experience to participate in politics (Hughes et al., 2007, p. 266). They thus increase the group 
of women that is available to participate. Supply side factors mainly consist of personal 
characteristics and a person’s resources (Hughes et al., 2007, p. 267).  
Personal characteristics can be divided into interest in politics, personal ambition and 
political knowledge. If one of these factors increases, a person is more likely to participate in 
politics. So, for example, more political knowledge leads to political participation. Research 
indicates that women have less political knowledge, interest and ambition than men (Hughes et 
al., 2007, p. 266; Bruns et al., 1997). Since people with more political knowledge, interest or 
ambition are more inclined to participate in politics, it matters that women score lower on these 
factors. This means that women are less inclined to participate in politics.2  
Resource factors contain the available time of a person, the extent to which someone 
has access to networks, the extent to which someone has civic skills, and a person’s education 
level and economic resources (Hughes et al., 2007, p. 267). This means that, for example, a 
person with more time is more likely to participate in politics.  
Next to having less of the personal characteristics that increase a person’s likelihood to 
participate in politics, women also have less of the necessary resources than men. They have 
less time to spend on politics because of home responsibilities (Conway, 2001, p. 232). Their 
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education levels also vary from men’s education levels and they often have different jobs than 
men. Men more often have jobs that provide them with financial resources, practical skills for 
organizing, expanded social networks and more opportunities to discuss politics (Hughes et al., 
2007, p. 267).  
Regarding the resource factors, Kenworthy and Malami found that women’s share in 
professional occupations is related to their political representation in parliament (Kenworthy 
and Malami, 1999, p. 257). Further on, women participate less in nonpolitical activities, which 
causes a differential acquisition of skills that are relevant to a political career (Conway, 2001, 
p. 232).  
There has been a major shift in women’s resources over the last decades. This is related 
to the second wave of feminism (Van de Loo & Mes, 2005). This shift in resources is a factor 
that increases the pool of women that is available to participate in politics. A factor that 
indicates this change in resources is the share of working women in a country. The assumption 
is that when more women work, more women will participate. This leads us to our first 
hypothesis. 
(1) Female labor market hypothesis: As more women work, more women participate in 
political party committees.  
Another factor that influences the availability of women that is available to participate 
in politics, is the number of female party members (Caul, 1999, p 83). After all, if more women 
are a member of a political party, more politically experienced women are available for 
committees as well. This also tells us something about the resources of women. We therefore 
also measure the share of female party members per party. This leads us to our second 
hypothesis.  
(2) Female party membership hypothesis: parties that have more female members are 
more likely to have women in their committees. 
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The second group of factors that influences women’s political participation are the 
demand-side factors or selection factors (Hughes et al, 2007, p. 266). These are factors that 
affect the likelihood that women are elected for office or the possibility for women to participate 
in political activities (Conway, 2001, p. 232; Caul, 1999, p. 80; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999).  
A factor that influences the demand-side of the number of women that will participate 
in politics on country level is the presence and structure of gender quotas (Hughes et al., 2007, 
p. 269; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Research found that placement mandates on candidate lists may 
prevent parties from burying women at the bottom. This is mostly looked at on the level of 
representation in parliaments, but also applies at the party level (Caul, 1999, p. 80). Specific 
rules may reflect a ‘culture’ that is consistent of the need for equal representation.  
Caul measured gender quota as a causal explanation for the number of women in 
parliament. We use the same factor as a possible causal explanation for the share of women that 
participates in political party committees. After all, having gender quota can also be an 
indication for a political party to have a more open culture and thus to have more women 
participating in committees. So, when a party has secured the obligation to have more women 
in committees, on party lists or in the board, the likelihood that more women will attend these 
institutes increases. This brings us to our third hypothesis.  
(3) Gender quota hypothesis: a party with gender quota is more likely to have a high 
share of women in its committees.   
Another factor that influences the demand of political parties for participating women 
is the extent to which women are active at various levels within a party (Caul, 1999, p. 88). For 
example, high levels of women working at the internal party offices may influence the 
participating number of women (Caul, 1999, p. 94). Next to this, the number of female party 
activists at the national executive, among middle-level elites and local party activists may 
influence the number of women participating (Caul, 1999, p. 89). These indicators show that 
having more female party activists increases the likelihood that a party selects women.  
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We can conclude from the above mentioned that the share of female members of 
parliament is a good indicator to measure the number of female party activists. This indicates 
the represented women in the party top. We expect that the share of female members of 
parliament per party will make it more likely that women participate in political party 
committees. This leads us to our fourth hypothesis. 
(4) Female party activists hypothesis: parties that have more women in parliament are 
more likely to have women in their committees. 
Lastly, the party ideology may influence the number of women participating (Caul, 
1999, p. 94; Hughes et al., 2007, p. 266; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 256). It is found that 
parties that are positioned more to the left have more women in parliament (Caul, 1999, p. 85-
86; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 256). A left-winged party thus increases the likelihood 
that this party selects women.  
It is expected that the party position influences the share of women in political party 
committees as well. This gives us our final hypothesis. 
(5) Party position hypothesis: parties that are positioned more to the left are more likely 
to have women in their committees.  
Case selection 
In our study, we look into the Netherlands. As Table 1 shows, the Netherlands scores well on 
female representation in the political area. First of all, the percentage of women in the Lower 
House is relatively high, namely 38% on January 1st, 2017, placing it number 21 out of the 193 
countries that are measured by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
2018). This percentage is not only far above the European and world average but has also 
increased since 1995. Next to this, both chambers of parliament have a female speaker. Only 
53 out of 278 countries have a female speaker (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018). Lastly, the 
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share of female ministers is also relatively high with 37.5%, placing it on the sixteenth place 
out of 186 countries.  
Scoring this well on female representation in politics makes the Netherlands a most 
likely case, which means the chances of finding a high share of women participating in political 
parties are bigger in the Netherlands than they are in other countries. If we do not find relations 
between our explanatory factors and the share of women participating in political parties in the 
Netherlands, it is not likely that we will find these relations when we study another country. 
After all, the indications of a positive climate regarding women’s political participation are 
lower in most other countries and thus the share of women participating is likely to be lower as 
well, making it more difficult to discover relationships.  
Table 1. Women's representation in politics.3 
Country % female MPs 
Lower House 
% female 
ministers  
Female 
heads of 
state  
Female 
speaker of 
parliament 
% female MPs 
Lower House 1995 
Iceland 47.6 40.0 No Yes 25.4 
Sweden 43.6 52.2 No No 40.4 
Finland 42.0 38.5 No No 33.5 
Norway 39.6 38.9 Yes No 39.4 
Spain 39.1 38.5 No Yes 16.0 
Belgium 38.0 23.1 No Yes 12.0 
The Netherlands 38.0 37.5 No Yes * 31.3 
Denmark 37.4 42.9 No Yes 33.0 
Germany 37.0 33.3 Yes Yes 26.2 
Slovenia 36.7 50.0 No No 14.4 
Portugal 34.8 22.2 No No 8.7 
New Zealand 34.2 37.0 No No 21.2 
Switzerland 32.5 28.6 Yes No 18.0 
Italy 31.0 27.8 No Yes 15.1 
Austria 30.6 23.1 No Yes* 23.5 
United Kingdom 30.0 30.8 Yes No 9.5 
Australia 28.7 24.1 No No 9.5 
Luxembourg 28.3 20.0 No No 20.0 
Canada 26.3 51.75 No No 18.0 
France 25.8 52.9 No No 6.4 
Ireland 22.2 26.7 No No 12.7 
United States of 
America 
19.1 N/A No No 10.9 
Greece 18.3 21.1 N/A No 6.0 
World  23.4 - - - 11.6 
Europe (region) 26.4 - - - 26.0 
N/A: not available; * in two chambers. 
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For our scope of a political party, we use the same as Caul’s study, meaning that we 
only look at the political parties that gained at least one seat in parliament in the election years 
for the Lower House over the years (1999, p. 84). Having a seat in parliament is thus the 
criterium to be included as a political party. The number of parties seated in the Lower House 
is very high in the Netherlands (see Table 2).  Looking at political parties in this country will 
thus offer us a large sample to look at. Since we are finding ourselves in a relatively 
undiscovered field, it is important that we increase our chances of finding plausible effects 
(Caul, 1999 p. 80). In our case, this means we want to study a country where we can expect to 
find a high share of women participating in political parties. If we look at more parties, the 
chances of finding such results increase.  
Table 2. Party numbers per country.4 
Country Number of parties in the Lower House  
Iceland 8 
Sweden 8 
Finland 9 
Norway 10 
Spain 8 
Belgium 10 
The Netherlands 14 
Denmark 15 
Germany 6 
Slovenia 10 
Portugal 10 
New Zealand 5 
Switzerland 6 
Italy 8 
Austria 6 
United Kingdom 10 
Australia 5 
Luxembourg 7 
Canada 5 
France 9 
Ireland 10 
United States of America 2 
Greece 6 
As we already mentioned briefly, we look at party committees to measure women’s 
participation in political parties. We narrowed these committees to election program 
committees and selection committees. The first type of committee is one that creates the 
program of a party for the elections. We included both election program committees for the 
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elections of the Lower House and for the election of the European Parliament. The selection 
committee is a committee that creates a candidate list for elections.  
Both tasks are important, since they influence who will take place in parliament and 
what topics will be most important for a party. Both factors thus matter for what people in the 
Netherlands can vote for, namely on which person they can vote and on which positions. In the 
Netherlands, these committees are usually temporary and appointed by the board of the parties. 
For these reasons, they give us a good picture of the internal structure and the possibilities for 
women in a party.  
The time scope of our study is from the 1970s till 2019. We measured our cases in the 
election years since the 1970s up until 2019, both for the elections of the European Parliament 
and for the elections of the Lower House. This means our starting year is 1971, since this was 
an election year (see Appendix 1 for all the election years between the 1970s and 2019). Around 
this time the second wave of feminism occurred (Van de Loo & Mes, 2005). This happening 
makes it more likely that change in the participating share of women can be measured over 
time, since women became more active in public life.   
Another reason for our starting point in the 1970s is that it is not likely that we would 
have found more cases going back in time. Table 3 shows this: the more we go back in time, 
the less cases we find.  
Data and methods 
We tested our hypotheses by looking into the share of women in political party committees. As 
discussed before, we look into both election program committees and selection committees of 
the political parties. For the election program committees, we look into both the election 
program committee for the European Parliament and for the Lower House. For the election 
committees, we look at all national election committees available, because these committees 
are likely to be appointed by the board of a party at the national level.  
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On the website of the Voting Council (Kiesraad, verkiezingsuitslagen.nl) we checked 
the parties that had a seat in parliament after the elections for the Lower House in every election 
year ( 
Appendix 2). The political parties that fall under this scope are only included in the 
dataset as far as the female committee member variable was available. Not for all of the parties 
that gained a seat in the Lower House, we found information on the committees (see Table 3 
and Table 4). These parties are therefore excluded from our database.  
The female committee member variable is gained by looking at the election programs, 
information on the websites of the political parties and by looking at the annual reviews and 
similar documents of the political parties. This information is available at the website of the 
Dutch Documentation Center of Political Parties (dnpp.nl). Also, we contacted all of the parties 
that currently have a seat in the Lower House, to see if they could provide us with additional 
data. Unfortunately, this provided us with very little response. 
The acquired names were divided into male and female, after which the women’s share 
was calculated. Every committee is treated as a single case. More details on the found cases can 
be found in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 6 shows us the descriptives of all of the variables. In 
this table we also included the years for which the other variables are available.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of used cases.5 
 1971-1982 1984 - 1994 1998 - 2006 2009 - 2019 Total 
People’s Party - 5 12 13 30 
Democrats ‘66 3 3 5 9 20 
GreenLeft - 2 6 11 19 
Labor Party 1 - 8 9 18 
Christian Democratic Appeal 1 3 3 8 15 
Christian Union - - 1 7 8 
Reformed Political Party - 1 - 2 3 
Party for the Elderly - - - 3 3 
DENK - - - 1 1 
Socialist Party - - - 1 1 
Animal Party - - - 1 1 
Political Party of Radicals 1 - - - 1 
Centre Party 1 - - - 1 
Reformatory Political 
Federation 
- 1 - - 1 
Reformed Political League - 1 - - 1 
Total  7 16 35 65 123 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of used cases: types of committees. 
 Election program 
committee Lower 
House 
Election program 
committee European 
Parliament 
Candidate 
selection 
committee 
Total 
People’s Party 9 3 18 30 
Democrats ‘66 13 4 3 20 
GreenLeft 9 5 5 19 
Labor Party 6 4 8 18 
Christian Democratic Appeal 9 3 3 15 
Christian Union 3 2 3 8 
Reformed Political Party - 3 - 3 
Party for the Elderly 2 1 - 3 
DENK 1 - - 1 
Socialist Party 1 - - 1 
Animal Party - 1 - 1 
Political Party of Radicals 1 - - 1 
Centre Party 1 - - 1 
Reformatory Political 
Federation 
- 1 - 1 
Reformed Political League - 1 - 1 
Total  55 28 40 123 
 
Figure 1. Histogram of the division in the share of female committee members. 
 
N=123 
On the basis of our hypotheses, we measured a number of explanatory variables. First 
of all, our female labor market variable consists of the share of women working in every year. 
This indicates the possible increase in the pool of women that is available for participating in 
 13 
political parties. The share of women working is measured by looking at information from 
CBS (2019). This information is available for each election year.   
For this variable, we specifically looked at the share of working women of the female 
part of society that is allowed to work. For the other variables, we looked at the share of women 
compared to men. This is the share of the total number of participants that is female. In our 
opinion, measuring only the changes in the share of working women instead of a percentage of 
the total labor force gives a better view of the female labor market.  
Our second explaining variable, the female party membership variable, consists of the 
share of female party members per party. We measured this over time by looking at the National 
Election Survey (Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, hereinafter: NKO) and by looking at several 
other surveys. These other surveys are the Party Survey of Leiden (Leids Partij Onderzoek, 
hereinafter: LPO) and various other surveys (Aarts et al., 2012; Aarts et al., 2010;  Aarts and 
Todosijevic, 2009; Den Ridder, 2014, p. 61; Lucardie and Voerman, 2010, p. 165; Hippe and 
Voerman, 2010, p. 200; Van de Velde, 1993, p. 167, 169, 172, and Leijenaar and Niemöller, 
1986, p. 186).  
The NKO asks the participants whether they are a party member, which party they 
belong to and asks their gender. With this information the share of female party members can 
be calculated. We implemented this as one variable. The LPO has direct information on the 
share of female party members of some of the larger parties over the years. Since some blocks 
of years were missing, we complemented the LPO with information from other sources. These 
have been integrated into one variable.  
After comparing both variables, we found that they are not as correlated as we would 
expect for two variables that measure the same (see Table 5). Therefore, we picked the variable 
that seems most reliable, which is the LPO and the additional surveys. These surveys used a 
larger sample than the NKO. The NKO outcomes gave some irregularities. For example, in one 
year only one member of the Reformed Political Party was measured, which was also a woman. 
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As a consequence, the share of female party members was hundred percent. In the next 
measured year, the number of female party members was zero. This does not give a very reliable 
variable. Therefore, for our analysis we used the LPO and additional surveys.  
Table 5. Correlation between female party member variables. 
  LPO NKO 
LPO Correlation 1 .248** 
 N 113 113 
NKO Correlation .248** 1 
 N 113 116 
**p ≤ 0.01; we used Pearson Correlation. 
Since not every year of the surveys matches the exact year of the committees, we 
extended the outcome of the survey years to five years before and five years after. The female 
membership increases gradually over the years, so this does not cause any problems.   
Thirdly, we measured our gender quota variable by looking at the by-laws and the 
internal rules. These are available at the website of the Dutch Documentation Center of Political 
Parties. We reported the measurement in either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. A party received a ‘yes’ when 
it has rules in the by-laws that contain the pursuance of having a fifty-fifty division between 
men and women on the candidate lists, on committees and/or on the board of the party. We 
looked at the by-laws and internal rules of all parties with a seat in the Lower House for the 
years that these were available going back in time to 1971. Since the by-laws and internal rules 
apply for the parties until they are amended, the outcomes were used for the years after this 
until a new change was made.  
In order to test our female party activists hypothesis, we measured the share of female 
members of parliament per party, our female MPs variable. We chose to only measure the 
members of the Lower House, because these members are chosen directly. The members of the 
Dutch Senate are chosen indirectly. We measured the female MPs in every election year since 
the 1970s (see Appendix 1 for all the election years). The female MPs variable indicates the 
number of women in the party elite, which was one of the causal factors for women to 
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participate (Caul, 1999, p. 94). For this data, we contacted the PDC Information Architecture. 
They provided us with the number of women per party in parliament after the elections for the 
Lower House in each year. We then calculated the share of women by using information from 
the website of the Voting Council (verkiezingsuitslagen.nl). We calculated this information per 
party and per election year of the Lower House. We used the data for the election years of the 
Lower House and for the years after this, until a new election took place.  
For our party position hypothesis, we measured the left/right position of parties, which 
is our party position variable (Caul, 1999, p. 87). In the past, left parties in the Netherlands have 
had more women in parliament than right parties, which is an indication that they also have 
more women in their committees than right parties (Caul, 1999, p. 87). The party position can 
be measured by using information from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys executed by Bakker et 
al. (2015 and 2017). We will use the measurement from their dataset called ‘lrgen’, which 
measures the overall ideological stance of a party on a left/right scale of zero (extreme left) to 
ten (extreme right). We also used two additional surveys, because the 1970s, 80s and 90s are 
not included in the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys. These are the ‘Expert Interpretations of Party 
Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies’ as executed by Huber and Inglehart (1995) and the 
‘Left-Right Political Scales: Some ‘Expert’ Judgments’ as executed by Castles and Mair (1984). 
Both surveys use a zero to ten scale as well, so they match the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys. 
The party position data are not available for all the election years. Since the party 
position did not change a lot over the years, we expanded the data to the years that were close 
to the year of measurement. We did this within a time span of ten years.  
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Table 6. Descriptives and diagnostics. 
 Mean  Modus Median  SD Min  Max N Unit/scale Data 
availability  
Female 
committee 
members  
34.61 
 
33.33 33.33 17.64 0.00 80.00 123 0-100 scale All election 
years  
Female labor 
market 
56.28 63.20 59.60 7.52 35.10 63.20 123 0-100 scale All years since 
1969 
Female party 
membership 
34.02 37.00 36.00 7.93 0 48.00 113 0-100 scale Varies per 
party  
Gender 
quota 
1.75 2 2.00 0.43 1 2 122 1=yes, 
2=no 
All years  
Female  
MPs 
35.06 0.00; 
50.00; 
57.14 
34.15 17.42 0 100.00 123 0-100 scale All years  
Party 
position 
5.20 2.60 5.23 1.90 1.27 8.11 120 0-10 scale 1984, 1995, 
1999, 2002, 
2006, 2010, 
2014, 2017 
The correlation matrix as shown in Table 7 shows us that we can expect to find relations 
between all of our independent variables and the dependent variable. Therefore, we first analyze 
the linear model for each of the independent variables individually. This means we will check 
for each of the variables whether there appears to be a positive or negative relationship between 
the independent variable and the dependent variable.  
A weakness in this method of analysis is the dependency of the independent variables 
on each other. As the correlation matrix in Table 7 shows, correlations also occur between the 
independent variables. Some of them are even very high. By executing bivariate regressions for 
each of the variables, this is not taken into account.  
In order to address this problem, we also executed multiple regression analyses. This 
gives us insight in the unique effect of each of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable.  
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Table 7. Correlation matrix. 
  Female 
committee 
members 
Female 
labor 
market 
Female 
party 
membership 
Gender 
quota 
Female 
MPs 
Party 
position 
Female committee 
members  
Correlation 1 0.40** 0.38** -0.33** 0.50** -0.24** 
 N 
 
123 123 113 122 123 120 
Female labor 
market 
Correlation 0.40** 1 0.25** -0.13 0.38** 0.01 
 N 
 
123 123 113 122 123 120 
Female party 
membership 
Correlation 0.38** 0.25** 1 -0.30** 0.63** -0.43** 
 N 
 
113 113 113 113 113 113 
Gender quota 
 
Correlation -0.33* -0.13 -0.30** 1 -0.56** 0.62* 
 N 
 
122 122 113 122 122 119 
Female MPs 
 
Correlation 0.50** 0.38** 0.63** -0.58** 1 -0.59** 
 N 
 
123 123 113 122 123 120 
Party position 
 
Correlation -0.24** 0.01 -0.43** 0.62** -0.59** 1 
 N 
 
120 120 113 119 120 120 
*p≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; we used Pearson Correlation.  
Results 
Before we go into the analyses and our causal explanations, we look into the results of the 
female committee members per party and per year. We made a graph that shows this 
information (Figure 2). As the graph shows, the average increases over the years, but it does 
not increase consistently. It also shows us that the results for most parties vary over the years. 
For example, the Christian Democratic Union scores very high in one year, but very low in 
another year. GreenLeft, the Labor Party, Democrats ’66 and the Christian Union seem to score 
more consistently, as their line fluctuates less. The Animal Party also scores high in the one 
year we have data for this party. In Appendix 3 we included the numbers of the average female 
committee members per party and per year. In general, we can say that the number of women 
participating in committees is usually under 50%. 
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Figure 2. Average female committee members.6 
 
Regarding the second part of our question, which is to find out to what extent we can 
explain the share of female committee members by each of our independent variables, we first 
used a simple linear regression. We did this for our female labor market variable, female party 
membership variable, gender quota variable, female MPs variable and party position variable. 
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 8.  
 As we already discussed in our data and method section, we also did a robustness check, 
by executing all of our analyses without the cases before 1994. Reason for this is that we do not 
have a lot of cases in the time period before 1994 (see Table 3. Descriptive statistics of used 
cases.5). The few cases we have in this time period may influence our models, especially since 
these cases are not spread well across the various parties. Since the female labor market variable 
is connected to the year of a committee, the value of this variable may vary less as well. By also 
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executing our analyses without these cases, we can find the influence of these cases. The results 
of these regressions are included in Appendix 4. We found that it changed our models only to 
a small extent. For this reason, we included the cases from these years in the rest of our analyses.  
All variables significantly predict the share of female committee members. All of the 
coefficients of the bivariate analyses are significant as well. The coefficient of the gender quota 
and the party position seem to give a steeper regression line. However, these variables are 
measured in different scales then the other variables. Whether or not a party has gender quota 
is measured in either a score of one or two (yes or no). The same applies to the party position 
variable. This is measured on a zero to ten scale. Therefore, a one to one change of these 
variables has a larger effect on the female share of committee members than a change of one in 
the other variables. This is simply because of the scale differences. The standardized coefficient 
gives a better possibility to compare the steepness of the regression lines.  
The strength of the relation between all explanatory variables and the share of female 
committee members is moderately strong. The r-squared values are all between 10 and 25%. 
The strength of the relation seems to be the weakest for the party position variable and the 
strongest for the female MPs variable.  
Table 8. Bivariate regressions. 
 Female labor 
market model  
Female party 
membership 
model 
Gender quota 
model 
Female MPs 
model 
Party 
position 
model 
Coefficient 0.90* 
(0.39) 
0.76* 
(0.38) 
-13.52* 
(-0.33) 
0.50* 
(0.49) 
-2.11** 
(-0.24) 
Intercept -16.04 10.43 58.48 17.28 46.52 
R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.24 0.06 
F 21.61* 18.51* 14.87* 38.88* 7.15** 
N 123 114 123 124 121 
*p≤0.001; **p ≤0.01 
Our female labor market hypothesis, our female party membership hypothesis, our 
gender quota hypothesis, our female party activists hypothesis and our party position hypothesis 
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all seem to find support in the linear models. As Table 8 shows, for the hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, 
the regression lines are positive, meaning an increase in the share of the female labor market 
variable, the female party membership variable and the female MPs variable all bring an 
increase in the share of female committee members. For the gender quota and party position 
hypothesis the regression line is negative, meaning that a change from yes to no in gender quota 
(value one or two) brings a decrease in the share of female committee members and an increase 
in party position brings a decrease in female committee members.  
In the linear regression analysis, we did not correct the models for the effects of the 
other variables. Because we also want to know the unique effect of each variable on the share 
of female committee members, we also executed multiple regression.  
 The first two models in Table 9 show us that the female MPs variable seems to have 
almost no influence on the model, since the coefficient is very close to zero. Also, the 
coefficient changes from positive to negative when we exclude the cases before 1994 (see 
Appendix 4). This makes it not likely that the female MPs variable causes change in the female 
committee member variable. Therefore, we also executed a multiple regression model without 
our female MPs variable (model 2).  
 When we compare the first two models in Table 9, we also notice that the effects of 
gender quota and party position are relatively low for both models. The standardized 
coefficients of these variables are relatively low, which means the unique effect of each of these 
variables has no big influence on the model. The low unique effect of the party position and 
gender quota variables, together with the low effect of female MPs variable can be explained 
by the high correlations between the female party membership variable, the gender quota 
variable, the female MPs variable and party position variable in the correlation matrix. This is 
also supported by the significance level of the variables. Namely, the chance that the 
coefficients are correct is very high for the share of working women and the female party 
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membership, while it is not very high for the other variables. This tells us that it is not likely 
that all the variables together predict the female committee member variable.    
Taken the information from the correlation matrix together with the first three models, 
we conclude that it might be the case that the share of female party members per party causes 
the variation in the other three variables as well as it explains the share of female committee 
members. So, we expect that having a higher female party membership causes more female 
members of parliament, a party position more to the left and makes it more likely for party to 
have gender quota. In order to see if our assumption is correct, we also executed a multiple 
regression model without the party position variable, the gender quota variable and the female 
MPs variable (model 3). The strength of the relation in this model (r-squared) is 20%. This is a 
strong connection.  
In order to control the robustness of model 3, we also generated a model with only the 
female labor market variable and the gender quota variable and then one with the female labor 
market variable and the party position variable. The coefficients of the gender quota variable 
and party position variable is still low. This means we can conclude model 3 predicts the female 
committee members best.  
Table 9. Multiple regression models for explaining women's participation in political party 
committees. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female labor market 0.66*** 
(0.30) 
0.68* 
(0.31) 
0.67* 
(0.31) 
Female party 
membership 
0.33 
(0.15) 
0.34 
(0.16) 
0.56** 
(0.26) 
Gender quota -4.85 
(-0.14) 
-5.16 
(-0.15) 
- 
Female MPs 0.03 
(0.29) 
- - 
Party position -0.99 
(-0.12) 
-1.07 
(-0.13) 
- 
Intercept 0.59 1.05 -20.32 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.20 
F 7.07* 8.91* 13.28* 
N 113 113 113 
*p≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; ***p≤0.05 
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Model 3 tells us that we start with a value of -20.32 for the female committee members 
variable. This variable increases with 0.67 for every increase in the female labor market 
variable of 1 and with 0.56 with every increase in the female party membership variable of 1. 
With this model, we can conclude that our female labor market hypothesis and our female party 
membership hypothesis find support in our study. Our female labor market hypothesis was the 
assumption that when more women work, more women will attend political party committees. 
Our female party membership hypothesis was the assumption that when a political party has 
more female members, more women will attend the committees. Since the unique effects of the 
female labor market variable and of the female party membership variable bring a significant 
increase in the share of female committee members, these hypotheses find support.  
The other three hypotheses do not find (strong) support. Our gender quota hypothesis 
contained the assumption that a party with gender quota is more likely to have a high share of 
women in their committees. While there seems to be a weak connection between a party having 
gender quota and the share of female committee members, this is not enough to say the 
hypothesis is supported. This can be explained by the fact that we also found a lot of party 
committees of parties without gender quota who had a high number of female committee 
members.  
Our female party activists hypothesis was the assumption that when a party has a high 
share of female members of parliament, this party is more likely to have a high share of female 
committee members. We found the weakest connection of all variables for this variable, and 
this hypothesis does not find support. Even though at the bivariate level the two seem related, 
the unique effect of the share of female members of the Lower House per party does not seem 
to cause the share of female committee members.  
Lastly, our party position hypothesis was the assumption that a party that is positioned 
more to the left is more likely to have a high share of female committee members. While there 
seems to be a weak connection between the party position and the share of female committee 
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members, the unique effect of the party position is low. Even though at the bivariate level the 
two seem related, the party position most likely does not cause the share of female committee 
members.  
Table 10. Summary of results. 
 Hypothesis Expected direction Bivariate effect Unique effect 
1 Female labor market  + + + 
2 Female party membership  + + + 
3 Gender quota - + (-) 
4 Female party activists + + (-) 
5 Party position - + (-) 
+ stands for a positive relationship 
- stands for a negative relationship. Results between brackets are not statistically significant. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
The first part of our question was to answer to what extent women participate in political parties. 
We found that their participation in political party committees overall increases over the years, 
as it does for most parties. However, this is not a consistent increase. The average of women 
that participates per party varies as well. GreenLeft, the Labor Party, Democrats ’66 and the 
Christian Union have a relatively consistent increase. Out of these parties, the first two mostly 
have the highest scores. Overall, we can conclude that the participation in political party 
committees could be higher and it still seems to be a bit of a men’s world.  
On the basis of the literature on women’s political participation, we also formulated five 
hypotheses about what causes women’s participation in political party committees. We focused 
on the factors that cause women to participate in political parties. As parties have a gatekeeper’s 
role, it is important to find out how accessible they are to minorities. In order to find out more 
about this undiscovered field, we looked into the political party committees. 
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We proposed that both the share of working women and the share of female party 
members have a strong causal relation with the share of female committee members. This was 
supported by the evidence, which shows that parties with more female members have more 
women in their committees. The evidence also shows that in the years that more women work, 
more women attend committees. We did not find support for the assumptions that having gender 
quota, having more female members of parliament or having a party position more to the left 
causes more women to attend committees. Even though these factors correlate with the share 
of female committee members, they most likely do not cause it.  
 Both the share of working women and the share of female party members per party can 
be considered to increase the pool of women. The share of working women is an indication that 
more women have the necessary resources to participate in politics, which consist of time, skills 
and experience. The share of female party members shows us whether the pool of women that 
is available to participate in politics increases as well. After all, when more women are available 
within a party, this increases the chance that they participate in committees.  
 What does this mean for the literature of women’s participation in political parties? First 
of all, our study shows that supply side factors are more important than selection factors. In 
literature both the supply and demand side were found to be important for women’s political 
participation. In contrary to this, our study shows that at the party level supply side factors are 
decisive. This means that women participate more in committees when more women are 
available. If parties want to increase the share of participating women, they thus have to find a 
way to increase their female members in general. It might be more difficult for parties to 
influence the share of working women.  
 Secondly, the results mean that differences between parties such as their position and 
having gender quota do not matter as much as expected. While the literature showed us that 
these factors matter for other forms of women’s political participation, it does not influence 
women’s participation in political party committees. It might be interesting to find out in further 
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research where these differences in explaining factors between women’s participation in 
political party committees and women’s participation in other political fields come from. As 
the share of women in parliament can be explained by party position and by gender quota, it 
would be interesting to see these differences explained.  
 What is positive about the results of our study is that we can predict that women will be 
represented in political parties more. As the share of working women is still increasing (CBS, 
2019), we can expect women to participate in political parties as well. This matters because of 
the gatekeepers’ role of political parties. As we discussed, selection committees are important 
for deciding who will take place in parliament and election program committees matter for 
deciding what topics will be placed high on the political agenda of a party. Women will 
influence both processes more in the future. This increases the representativeness of women 
and may influence the topics discussed in parliament. More research is necessary to find out 
which topics women put on the election program compared to men and to find out the effects 
of having women in selection committees on the election lists.  
 We cannot say with certainty that similar effects will be found in other countries. Reason 
for this is the explorative character of our study. We used the Netherlands as a case because of 
its leading position regarding women’s political representation and the large party number. The 
expectation was that if we would not find relations between our explaining factors and the 
female committee members in such a most likely case, we would not find this in other countries. 
As we found relations, these should be tested in other countries as well.  
 A limitation of this study is the number of cases. Even though we used 123 cases, the 
study would have been more reliable if more cases were available. For example, we had to 
exclude parties that were seated in parliament over the years (see  
Appendix 2). These parties might have influenced our models. Unfortunately, no data on the 
committees of these parties was available. Since the parties that we could include were divided 
over various backgrounds, our sample can be considered representative.   
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Notes 
1. We are not measuring the personal characteristics. Reason for this is that the available 
data for this variable shows contradictions: the NKO shows a decrease in political 
interest in general and for women, whereas data from the SCP shows that this has been 
stable the past decade (Aarts and Todosijevic, 2009; Van Houwelingen and Dekker, 
2018, p. 63-64). No other studies are available on this.  
2. Hughes et al. also discuss a third group of explaining factors: factors that influence both 
the supply and demand side. They call this ‘cultural attitudes and beliefs’ (Hughes et 
al., 2007, p. 266; Matland and Studlar, 1998 and Conway, 2001, p. 231-232). Factors 
that play a role in this regard are for example: cultural beliefs (Hughes et al., 2007, p. 
271), the number of women that works (Matland and Studlar, 1998), the number of 
women holding high profile offices, which has a positive effect on the voice of other 
women in the policy process (Blumeneau, 2019, p. 29) or the timing of women’s 
suffrage (Caul, 1999, p. 94; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 256). 
3. Data from the table is retrieved from Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018 and Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 2007. We included relatively older Western democracies. This is 
not a limitative list in any way. The table is only meant to show the exceptional position 
of the Netherlands.  
4. The information is retrieved from the official websites of the parliament of each country 
and concerns the status in December 2019. 
The number of parties applies only for the Lower House. Individual members are not 
included. For some countries, the parties in parliament have to be a member of a group. 
If this is the case, the groups are counted. 
5. The cases are divided into blocks of election years, to keep the table orderly. Also, 
information on the years this party was seated in the Lower House, information on the 
Dutch party names and information on the predecessors is included in  
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6. Appendix 2. 
7. The graph does not include the years before 1985, because these were only a few results. 
The averages of these years and parties are shown in Appendix 3. 
Appendix 
Appendix 1. Election years in the scope of this study. 
Lower House European Parliament 
1971 - 
1972 - 
1977 - 
- 1979 
1981 - 
1982 - 
- 1984 
1986 - 
1989 1989 
1994 1994 
1998 - 
- 1999 
2002 - 
2003 - 
- 2004 
2006 - 
- 2009 
2010 - 
2012 - 
- 2014 
2017 - 
- 2019 
 
Appendix 2. Dutch parties in the Lower House. 
Used party name Dutch name and 
abbreviation 
Years seats gained after Lower House 
elections  
Cases 
available 
Labor Party Partij van de Arbeid 
(PvdA) 
1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982; 1986; 
1989; 1994; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 
2010; 2012; 2017 
Yes  
People’s Party Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en Democratie 
(VVD) 
1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982; 1986; 
1989; 1994; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 
2010; 2012; 2017 
Yes  
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Democrats ‘66 Democraten ’66 (D66) 1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982; 1986; 
1989; 1994; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 
2010; 2012; 2017 
Yes 
Christen Democratic 
Appeal 
Christen Democratisch 
Appèl (CDA) 
1977; 1981; 1982; 1986; 1989; 1994; 
1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 2010; 2012; 
2017 
Yes 
GreenLeft GroenLinks 1989; 1994; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 
2010; 2012; 2017 
Yes 
Christian Union ChristenUnie 2002; 2003; 2006; 2010; 2012; 2017 Yes 
Animal Party Partij voor de Dieren 
(PvdD) 
2003; 2006; 2010; 2012; 2017 Yes 
Socialist Party Socialistische Partij 
(SP) 
1994; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 2010; 
2012; 2017 
Yes 
Party for the Elderly 50PLUS 2012; 2017 Yes 
Reformed Political 
League* 
Gereformeerd Politiek 
Verbond (GPV) 
1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982; 1986; 
1989; 1994; 1998 
Yes 
Reformatory Political 
Federation* 
Reformatorische 
Politieke Federatie 
(RPF) 
1977; 1981; 1982; 1986; 1989; 1994; 
1998 
Yes 
Reformed Political 
Party 
Staatkundig 
Gereformeerde Partij 
(SGP) 
1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982; 1986; 
1989; 1994; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 
2010; 2012; 2017 
Yes 
DENK DENK 2017 Yes 
Forum for Democracy Forum voor 
Democratie (FvD) 
2017 No 
Party for Freedom Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(PVV) 
2006; 2010; 2012; 2017 No 
Livable Netherlands Leefbaar Nederland 
(LN) 
2003 No 
List Pim Fortuyn Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF) 
2002; 2003 No 
General Elderly 
Alliance 
Algemeen Ouderen 
Verbond (AOV) 
1994 No 
Union 55+ Unie 55+ 1994 No 
Centre Democrats Centrumdemocraten 1989; 1994 No 
Centre Party Centrum Partij (CP) 1982 Yes 
Political Party of 
Radicals** 
Politieke Partij 
Radicalen (PPR) 
1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982; 1986 Yes 
Pacifist Socialist 
Party** 
Pacifistisch 
Socialistische Partij 
(PSP) 
1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982; 1986 No 
Communist Party of 
the Netherlands ** 
Communistische Partij 
van Nederland (CPN) 
1971; 1972; 1977; 1981; 1982 No 
Evangelical People’s 
Party** 
Evangelische 
Volkspartij (EVP) 
1982 No 
Catholic People’s 
Party*** 
Katholieke Volkspartij 
(KVP) 
1971; 1972 No 
Anti-Revolutionairy 
Party*** 
Anti-Revolutionaire 
Partij (ARP) 
1971; 1972 No 
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Christian Historical 
Union*** 
Christelijk-Historische 
Unie (CHU) 
1971; 1972 No 
Farmers’ Party Boerenpartij 1971; 1972; 1977 No 
Democratic Socialists 
‘70 
Democratisch 
Socialisten ’70 (DS70) 
1971; 1972; 1977 No 
Roman Catholic Party 
Netherlands  
Rooms Katholieke 
Partij Nederland 
(RKPN) 
1972 No 
Dutch Middle Class 
Party 
Nederlandse 
Middenstands Partij 
1971 No 
* merged together in 2004 into the Christian Union. Operated in the Lower House as the 
Christian Union since 15 March 2001 (parliament.com).  
** merged together in 1990 into GreenLeft (parliament.com). 
*** merged together in 1980 into the Christian Democratic Appeal (parliament.com). 
 
Appendix 3a. Average female committee members (part 1). 
 
All 
parties 
Labor 
Party 
People's 
Party 
Democrats 
'66 
Christian 
Union 
GreenLeft Animal 
Party 
Christian 
Democratic 
Appeal 
Socialist 
Party 
1971 0.00 0.00 - - - - - - - 
1972 - - - - - - - - - 
1977 0.00 - - 0.00 - - - - - 
1979 - - - - - - - - - 
1981 16.94 - - 37.5 - - - 13.33 - 
1982 18.75 - - 37.5 - - - - - 
1984 - - - - - - - - - 
1986 20.04 - 12.5 33.33 - - - 14.29 - 
1989 32.70 - 33.33 37.5 - - - 27.27 - 
1994 19.27 - 31.11 21.43 - 33.33 - 31.25 - 
1998 37.62 - 40.83 26.67 - 37.5 - 29.41 - 
1999 33.33 - - - - 33.33 - - - 
2002 33.94 45.56 30.14 26.67 - 33.33 - 22.22 - 
2003 32.64 32.43 40.00 25.00 - 33.33 - - - 
2004 51.96 44.44 - 40.00 - 71.43 - - - 
2006 34.42 48.53 30.00 14.29 16.67 44.44 - 38.46 - 
2009 47.51 69.23 30.00 40.00 - 37.5 75.00 33.33 - 
2010 38.88 50.00 38.01 17.86 30.00 58.85 - 33.33 - 
2012 35.60 50.00 25.23 33.33 33.33 53.57 - 79.16 - 
2014 31.97 42.86 26.14 37.5 18.18 30.00 - 42.86 - 
2017 34.42 50.98 37.12 33.33 33.33 30.5 - 0.00 23.08 
2019 47.41 55.56 40.18 63.33 27.41 61.61 - 50.00 - 
All  34.48 44.45 33.56 35.76 26.72 45.05 75.00 35.80 23.08 
- : no data available. 
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Appendix 3b. Average female committee members (part 2). 
 All 
parties 
Party 
for the 
Elderly 
Reformed 
Political 
League 
Reformatory 
Political 
Federation 
Reformed 
Political 
Party 
DENK Centre 
Party 
Political 
Party of 
Radicals 
1971 0.00 - - - - - - - 
1972 - - - - - - - - 
1977 0.00 - - - - - - - 
1979 - - - - - - - - 
1981 16.94 - - - - - - 0.00 
1982 18.75 - - - - - 0.00 - 
1984 - - - - - - - - 
1986 20.04 - - - - - - - 
1989 32.70 - - - - - - - 
1994 19.27 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - 
1998 37.62 - - - - - - - 
1999 33.33 - - - - - - - 
2002 33.94 - - - - - - - 
2003 32.64 - - - - - - - 
2004 51.96 - - - - - - - 
2006 34.42 - - - - - - - 
2009 47.51 - - - - - - - 
2010 38.88 - - - - - - - 
2012 35.60 11.11 - - - - - - 
2014 31.97 - - - 18.18 - - - 
2017 34.42 0.00 - - - 25.00 - - 
2019 47.41 14.86 - - 22.22 - - - 
All  34.48 8.66 0.00 0.00 13.47 25.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Appendix 4. Robustness control models. 
Appendix 4a. Bivariate regression models excluding cases before 1994. 
 Female labor market model  
Female party 
membership 
model 
Gender quota 
model 
Female MPs 
model 
Party 
position 
model 
Coefficient 0.37 
(0.08) 
0.57** 
(0.27) 
-10.64** 
(-0.29) 
0.40* 
(0.38) 
-2.70* 
(-0.32) 
Intercept 15.75 18.68 56.43 22.93 52.11 
R-squared 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.10 
F 0.61 7.17** 9.27** 16.97* 11.03* 
N 101 95 100 101 101 
*p≤0.001; **p ≤0.01. 
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Appendix 4b. Multiple regression robustness control. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Female labor market 0.66*** 
(0.30) 
0.89** 
(0.26) 
Female party membership 0.33 
(0.15) 
0.42 
(0.21) 
Gender quota -4.85 
(-0.14) 
-5.27 
(-0.16) 
Female MPs 0.03 
(0.29) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
Party position -0.99 
(-0.12) 
-1.42 
(-0.18) 
Intercept 0.59 -11.11 
R-squared 0.25 0.23 
F 7.07* 5.8* 
N 113 101 
Model 1 includes all cases; model 2 excludes the cases before 1994.  
*p≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; ***p≤0.05. 
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